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Abstract
Indian agriculture is characterized by the predominance of smallholders. This paper seeks 
to examine the access of small holders to agriculture credit in the context of financial 
sector  reforms  in  India  in  the  nineties.  It  explores  the  role  of  institutional  and  non 
institutional agencies in extending agriculture credit to the smallholder and the ground 
realities as revealed by recent data sets. The nineties also saw the unfolding of the largest 
microfinance  programme  in  the  world  in  India.  While this  was  very  successful  in 
bringing micro enterprises under the credit purview, it was unable to cater to the need for 
agriculture credit. This paper examines the reasons for this and suggests that  newer kinds 
of institutional innovations in the Pilot stage like, Joint Liability Groups, VDC- Farmers 
Club  Model,  SHG-Contract  Farming  Linkage  model  which  seek  to  overcome  the 
difficulties faced by smallholders in accessing agriculture credit are effective. They need 
to be upscaled and mainstreamed  in order to bring about vibrancy in the rural credit 
market in India.   
Keywords: Agriculture credit;  Farm Size 
JEL  codes: Q1, Q152
1 INTRODUCTION
Indian  agriculture  is  structurally  small  farm  and  smallholder based.  Though  the  net 
cropped area in the country has remained at 135-140 million hectares since 1970-71, 
foodgrain production increased by 112 percent between 1970-71 and 2007-08, indicating 
the key role played by smallholders in attaining food self sufficiency. However, in terms 
of availability of credit facilities, smallholders have borne the major brunt of the banking 
sector reforms in the 1990s. Credit flow to smallholders has reduced along with a sharp 
decline in the absolute number of agricultural loan accounts. 
This paper discusses the trends since the post-1991 policies in the credit markets for 
small  farms and  the  implications  of  this  policy  stance for  production  share  and 
productivity  of  small  and  marginal  farmers.  The  1990s  also  witnessed  the  rise  of 
microfinance as an alternative to the weakened rural credit markets. In India the Self 
Help Group (SHG)-Bank linkage programme linking banking sector credit to informal 
groups grew manifold to emerge as the largest microfinance programme in the world. 
However  existing  forms  of  microfinance  and  microenterprise  financing  might  be 
unsuitable to fully serve the credit needs of agriculture. Additionally, tenant farmers and 
oral  lessees  without  land  to  serve  as  collateral  find  it  difficult  to  access  credit  from
mainstream banks. In order to address this, innovations in microfinance technologies like 
the Joint Liability Group, the Kerala model of horticulture development which identify 
collateral substitutes present interesting alternatives. The paper discusses the extent to 
which these innovations provide an alternate credit framework for smallholders.
2 LANDHOLDING PATTERN IN INDIA
Rural India is characterized by the predominance of households who own less than 2 
hectares of land (small farmers). In 2003, marginal holdings (less than or equal to 1 ha)
and the landless comprising 80 percent of rural households owned percent of total area. 
The average area owned per household in rural areas has declined from 1.78 hectares in 
1961-62 to 0.73 hectares in 2003 reflecting the increasing pressure of rural population on 
the limited land base (Figure 1). 3
















2.1 Increasing Marginalisation 
Operational holdings – land owned, leased in or otherwise possessed – distinct from 
household ownership holding -restricted to the area of land owned – assume importance 
from  the  standpoint  of  agriculture  operations.  The  number of    operational  holdings 
doubled from 51 million to 101 million between 1961-62 and 2003 reflecting the pressure 
of  rising  population  and  the  decline  in  cultivated  area.  Area  operated,  133  million 
hectares in  1960-61  reduced  to  107  million  hectares  (2003).  Similarly,  average  area 
operated per holding declined from 2.63 hectares in 1960-61 to 1.34 hectares in 1991-92 
and was 1.07 hectares in 2003 (NSSO, 2006). 
Table 1: Distribution of Operational Holdings and Operated Area
Percentage of Operational Holdings Percentage of Operated Area
Category 1970-71 1991-92 2003 1970-71 1991-92 2003
Marginal 45.8 62.8 71 9.2 15.6 22.6
Small 22.4 17.8 16.6 14.8 18.7 20.9
Semi-
Medium
17.7 12 9.2 22.6 24.1 22.5
Medium 11.1 6.1 4.3 30.5 26.4 22.2
Large  3.1 1.3 0.8 23 15.2 11.8
All Sizes 100 100 100 100 100 100
Marginal = < 1 hectare (ha). Small = 1-2 ha. Semi medium = 2-4 ha. Medium = 4-10 ha. Large = Above 10 ha
Source: NSSO.  Some Aspects of Operational Land Holdings in India, 2002-03, Report No 492, 
Government of India, (2006)
As seen in Table 1, operational holding pattern in India has become skewed over the 
years.  The  share  of  marginal  holdings  in  total  operational  holdings  increased.  The 
proportion of small holdings has declined in terms of operational holdings but  their share 
in operated area has increased. The share of medium and large farmers has declined both 
in  terms of operational holdings and area operated  over three decades. However, the 
semi-medium category has increased their share in the operational holdings though their 
share in the operated area has remained constant over three decades. 4
2.2 Contribution of Smallholders to Agricultural Production
Smallholders have increased their share in both foodgrain and non-foodgrain production 
in India over the years. Singh, Kumar, and Woodhead (FAO, 2002) found that  holdings 
smaller  than  2.00  hectares  accounted  for  41  percent  of  total  foodgrain  production  in 
1990-91 as against 34 percent in 1980-81. Smallholders were also the major producers of 
vegetables and fruits contributing 51 percent of the production in 1991.  Though Singh et 
al.  assume equal yields across farm sizes, they found evidence of  an inverse relationship 
between productivity and farm size. Incorporating this implies that the estimates for the 
proportionate contributions from the smaller holdings would further increase. 
A back of the envelope calculation suggests that by 2001 smallholders were contributing 
around 47 percent of the cereal production and 33 percent of the pulse production in the 
country Smallholders also possess the highest share of livestock in India (cattle, buffalo, 
goats  and  pigs).  The Livestock  Holding  Survey (NSSO,  2002-03) showed that 
smallholders account for 70 percent of the in-milk bovine stock in 2002-03. Their share 
in total poultry stood at 63 percent in 2002-03. Thus, the welfare of the smallholders has 
powerful implications for overall agricultural production and therefore for food security.
3 Agriculture Credit – Share of  Smallholders  
Table 2:  Distribution of Holdings & Agriculture Credit Flow
Category
Share in operational holdings Share in area operated Share in agri.credit disbursed Share in no. of agri. accounts
1981-82 1991-92 2003 1981-82 1991-92 2003 1981-82 1991-92 2002-03 1981-82 1991-92 2002-03
Marginal 56 62.8 71 11.5 15.6 22.6 27.77 28.79 22.12 50.59 45.42 38.9
Small 19.3 17.8 16.6 16.6 18.7 20.9 20.66 24.87 25.52 24.61 31.43 30.17
Large  24.7 19.4 14.3 71.9 65.7 56.5 51.57 46.34 52.36 24.8 23.15 30.93
Total 100 100 101.9 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Note: (i) Agriculture credit  pertains to Scheduled Commercial Banks
         (ii) Source for operational holdings/operated area as cited in Table 1.5
Over the last two decades, while the share of marginal farmers in operated area and 
operational holdings has increased, their share in  total agriculture credit has declined
(Table  2).  Similarly,  the  share  of  marginal  farmers  in  the  total  number of  accounts 
declined to 38.9 percent in 2002-03. A decline in the number of accounts of marginal
holdings combined with an increase in the number of marginal holdings shows the ‘non-
inclusive’ nature of commercial banking vis- a-vis smallholders.
Small farmers have increased their share in the area operated between 1991-92 and 2002-
03 but their share in agriculture credit remained almost stagnant. With regard to land 
holding size 2 hectares and above, though the area operated has declined, the share in 
both agriculture credit flow and the number of accounts has increased during the nineties. 
With  increasing  commercialization  and  diversification  of  Indian  agriculture, it  is 
incorrect to argue that the credit requirements of smallholders may have reduced. These 
trends  reflect the  growing  apathy  that  commercial  banks  show  towards  lending  to 
smallholders. This aspect of credit exclusion is discussed in detail in Section 5.
4 IS  AGRICULTURAL  GROWTH  IMPORTANT  FOR  POVERTY 
REDUCTION?
Three-quarters of India’s poor live in rural areas and are dependent on agriculture for 
their livelihood. The latest official statistics on poverty indicate that the pace of reduction 
in absolute numbers has been slow though incidence of rural poverty declined from 37.3 
to 28.3 percent between 1993-94 and 2004-05. 
4.1 Poverty and Land Size:
According  to  Ravallion  and  Datt  (1996),  84.5  percent  of  the  substantial  poverty  
reduction in India during 1951 to 1991 was due to agricultural growth. While change in 
yields of crops impacts poverty, wage rates are also important to poverty reduction and 
higher farm productivity is closely associated with higher wage rates. Similarly, food 
prices  are  important  and  higher  farm  productivity  reduces  food  prices.  Thus,  farm 
production is crucial to reduce poverty. These findings have important implications for 
poverty reduction. 6
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Figure 2 shows that the percentage of poor declines as land size increases. Poverty trends, 
especially  with  respect  to  land  size,  indicate  ability to access  agriculture  credit from 
formal sources as land in rural areas acts as a collateral. Does the size of land one have
determine  access  to  agriculture  credit  from  formal  agencies?  These trends  shall  be 
discussed in the next section. 
5. ACCESS TO CREDIT IN RURAL INDIA - INSTITUTIONAL VERSUS NON-
INSTITUTIONAL
Institutional agencies accounted for 7.2 percent of the total cultivator debt in 1951 and 
increased  their  share  substantially  in  subsequent  decades to 66.3  percent (1991). 
However, the share of the institutional credit agencies in the outstanding amount of cash 
dues of rural households declined to 57 percent in 2002 (NSSO, All  India Debt and 
Investment Survey, 2003). This reversal and decline in the share of credit agencies in the 
nineties can be attributed to the decline in the share of commercial banks. The survey also 
revealed  that  the  ground  lost  by  commercial  banks  has  been  largely  gained  by 
moneylenders; a disturbing trend which threatens to over-run the good work done by the 
State over various decades to reduce the influence of the non-institutional agencies. Non-
institutional credit grew at a compound annual growth of 19.4 percent during the period 
1991-2002 as compared to the 15.4 percent growth recorded by institutional agencies 
during this period.7
5.1 Access to Credit- Farmer Households
The NSSO’s first independent household survey to ascertain the status of farming and 
farmers in India in 2003 estimated that around 43.42 million (48.6 percent) of total farmer 
households in India were indebted (Table 3).  The remaining- 45.91 million (51.4 percent) –
were not indebted and might have been financially excluded. 












Col (4) as 
% of Col 
(2)
          1           2        3               4        5
Northern 109460 51.4 27423 25.05
North East  34874 19.7 1448 4.15
Eastern  211140 39.9 39467 18.69
Central  271341 41.7 60814 22.41
Western  103662 53.8 45586 43.98
Southern  161578 72.7 69072 42.75
Union Territories 732 50.8 156 21.31
All India 893504 48.6 246654 27.61
Source: Adapted from Situation Assessment Survey of Farmers: Indebtedness of Farmer 
Households, National Sample Survey 59th Round (January-December 2003), Report No. 
498(59/33/1).
Table 3 indicates that in India only 27.61 percent of the total farmer households in the 
country  access  credit  from  institutional  sources with wide  regional  variations. In  the 
northeastern  region,  only  4.15  percent  of  farmer  households  access  credit  from 
institutional sources. The Western and Southern regions fare better but even here, less 
than 50 percent of farmer households access credit from institutional sources. Excluding
the  western  and  the  southern  regions,  reveals  that  less  than  one-fifth  of  total  farmer 
households or 18.32 percent access credit from institutional agencies.
5.2 Distribution of Debt - Land size wise
Table 4 shows that incidence of indebtedness and the share of institutional finance in the 
outstanding  debt  for  all-India  increased  with  size  of  land  holding.  The  incidence  of 
indebtedness increased from 46 percent for smallholders to 66 percent for large farmers 
and the share of institutional agencies in the debt increased from 51 to 68 percent.8





























< 0.01 1.4 1.3 45.3 6121 22.6 77.4
0.01 – 0.40 32.8 30.0 44.4 6545 43.3 56.7
0.41 – 1.00 31.7 29.8 45.6 8623 52.8 47.2
1.01 – 2.00 18.0 18.9 51.0 13762 57.6 42.3
Up to 2.00 83.9 79.9 46.3 8870 51.3 49.7
2.01 – 4.00 10.5 12.5 58.2 23456 65.1 35.0
4.01 – 10.00 4.8 6.4 65.1 42532 68.8 31.1
10.00 + 0.9 1.2 66.4 76232 67.6 32.4
All Sizes 100.0 100.0 48.6 12595 57.7 42.4
Source: NSSO, Situation Assessment Survey of Farmers, 2005. 
Compared to large farmers, smallholders depend more on non-institutional agencies to 
meet  their  credit  requirements.  To  illustrate,  for  large  farmers,  one-third  of  their 
outstanding debt was from non-institutional sources whereas for the smallholder around 
50 percent of their debt was financed by non-institutional agencies at the all India level 
(Table 4). Thus, access to formal credit is not favourable to the smallholder.
Village-based surveys in 1993-94 in Tamil Nadu on a sample of 115 households also 
revealed that 85 percent of households with more than 5 acres get state-regulated loans as 
compared to a mere 6 percent of those with under 0.1 acre and 3 percent of landless 
households.  Other studies also indicate a threshold of 5 acres that enable access to 
formal sector credit (B.Harriss-White and Colatei.D, 2007). 
Landless households and those with marginal  holdings (58 percent), obtain less than 10 
percent of the credit disbursed by formal institutions. More than 50 percent of the formal 
credit is taken by 7 percent of households holding above 5 acres of land. The possession 
of a micro-holding (0.1 to 1 acre) enables households to double the size of their loans 
over those of the landless with equivalent incomes.
5.2.1 Land as collateral in rural areas- Issues
For a borrower, collateral is a means to gain access to finance, whereas for a lender, 
collateral is a screening mechanism to share risk and compensate for default. Land affects 
both the supply of, and the demand for, credit. The collateral role of land may determine 
the supply of credit to its owner. In an agrarian economy land is found to be the most 
widespread form of collateral. In the case of smallholders, land becomes a problematic 
collateral because- (i) they own little of it; and (ii) they are risk-averse to mortgage land 
as they depend on it for their livelihood. So the smallholders offer other non-land forms 
of  collateral  like commitments  of  future  labour,  crops,  utensils,  gold,  third-party 
guarantees  or  reputation  underwritten  by  kinship.  As  institutional credit  institutions 9
discriminate against these other forms of collateral, access to credit for smallholders is 
reduced. 
Harriss-White.B.and Colatei.D (2007) observed that in the case of formal institutions, 
land and gold were the two most important collaterals for cooperative and commercial 
banks. The mechanism was different in the case of informal sources with 25 percent of 
the loans being unsecured by any kind of collateral, while crops (14 percent), labour (12 
percent), bonds and jewellery (20 percent) were more generally accepted security for the 
other 75 percent. Strikingly, in less than 1 percent of the cases, land itself is used as a 
collateral. Thus, though land is rarely used as a collateral, it is a screening device for  
lenders and is used “as a second-order collateral of last resort, activated only in cases of 
long  default,  when  the  first-order  collateral  has  been  relinquished  by  the  borrower”. 
Though one has to be cautious in generalizing the Tamil Nadu case for the whole of 
India, it nevertheless is a fair depiction of what happens in other parts of the country. 
One  possible  solution  to  this  is  to  ensure  that  landless and  smallholders  are  able  to 
purchase land as it would lead to broadening their collateral base and thereby enable 
access to formal sector credit. This would also lead to redistribution of a productive asset 
in the absence of  pro-poor land reforms. A scheme to finance small and marginal farmers 
to  purchase land  for  agricultural  purposes  by  formal  credit  agencies  is  under 
implementation since August 2001. However, the experience in this regard has not been 
very encouraging as the high cost of land becomes a prohibitive factor for agencies to 
finance the target group. Further, the  returns from the use of  the purchased land do not 
cover the cost of  land making the credit agency apprehensive and the scheme a virtual 
non-starter. 
5.3 Institutional Credit to Agriculture - Post Liberalisation Period




1991-92 5797 596 4806 11199
2001-02 23604 4854 33587 62045
2003-04 26959 7581 52441 86981
2005-06 39404 15223 125859 180486
2006-07 42480 20435 140382 203297
2007-08 43684 24814 156850 225348
Compound Annual Growth Rates
1991-92 to 2001-02 13.6 21 19.3 16.8
2002-03 to 2007-08 13 32.5 31.6 26.5
Source: RBI and NABARD
In 1991, cooperatives accounted for more than 50 percent in the total institutional credit 
flow to agriculture. Since then their share has declined rapidly, especially after 2003-04
with commercial banks emerging as the major providers of agriculture credit, accounting 
for 70 percent in 2007-08 and RRBs providing 11 percent of the total credit flow (Table 10
5). This decline in the share of the cooperatives is an area of grave concern as they have 
the largest outreach  in rural areas (Annexure I) and have been found to be ‘friendlier’ in 
catering to the credit needs of smallholders and the landless. 
5.3.1 Doubling of Agriculture Credit in 3 years 
In 2004, the new government announced the doubling of agriculture credit with respect to 
the base period of 2003-04 within a period of three years through the “ Doubling of 
Agriculture  Credit” Programme.  The  expectation  was  that  this  would  increase 
institutional  credit  flow  to  the  agriculture  sector,  address  inequities  between  regions, 
inter-agency shares would become less skewed, improve distribution of credit among 
various  categories  of  farmers and  include  new  farmers  in institutional  credit  flow
(NABARD, 2009). The following sections discuss the results, evidence and impact of the 
programme. 
5.3.2 Regional Distribution
At the all India level, credit institutions more than doubled  the flow of  agriculture credit 
from the base year (2003-04) disbursement  of  Rs 869.80 bln to Rs. 2032.96 bln in 2006-
07; exceeding the target (Rs. 1750 bln in 2006-07) by 16 percent. However, in relative 
terms  there  was  hardly  any  change  in  terms  of  the  inter- regional  distribution  of 
agriculture credit during this period (Table 6).
   



















area in their 
respective 
region
1 2 3 4 5 6
Northern  28.74 28.24 20.11 26.32 15.87
North 
eastern 0.40 0.37 2.83 0.68 36.28
Eastern 6.65 6.85 14.66 15.25 64.79
Central 16.45 13.93 27.26 31.66 43.29
Western 13.33 14.92 16.47 9.74 34.40
Southern 34.43 35.70 18.68 16.36 45.28
Note: Col(6) is based on  Agriculture Census, 2001. GCA & GIA pertains to 2005-06.
Source: NABARD, RBI and Centre For Monitoring Indian Economy(CMIE) 
The Southern and Western regions together accounted for just over 50 percent of the 
credit flow in 2006-07 though they account for 35 percent of the GCA and 26 percent of 
GIA. The Central region which accounts for more than a quarter of  GCA lost out in 
terms of its share in agriculture credit during the period. The Eastern region, comparable 
to the Western region in terms of share in  the GCA and with a higher share in the GIA11
had  less  than half  the  credit  flow  with  hardly  any improvement  during the  doubling 
period (Table 6).
The inequities become worse if we correlate the share of marginal and small holdings in 
the respective regions with the share of agriculture credit flow in the region. To illustrate,
marginal and small  holdings account for over  65  percent of the operated area in  the 
eastern region but agriculture credit flow does not incorporate this in the disbursement 
pattern. The figures for the North Eastern region suggest the rise of an alarming situation 
where  the  credit  flow  pattern  has  no  relation  with  the  share  of  marginal  and  small 
holdings in the operated area, share in the gross cropped and irrigated area in the region 
(Table  6).  It  is  evident  that  the  doubling  programme  was  unable  to  moderate  these 
inequities in the credit flow across regions. 
5.3.3 Changing Share of Agencies- Implications for small and marginal farmers 
The  implementation  of  the  scheme  has  resulted  in  a  change  in  the  share  of  various 
agencies in the agriculture credit flow between 2003-04 and 2006-07.  The shares of 
commercial banks increased by 10 to 16 percentage points in all the States while those of 
RRBs increased marginally in Madhya Pradesh, Tamil Nadu and Maharashtra. In Uttar 
Pradesh and Rajasthan, the RRBs’ share declined drastically. The shares of Co-operatives 
declined in all States except Rajasthan. Thus, during the doubling period the share of 
commercial  banks  increased  substantially  in  the  total  agriculture  credit  flow  in 
comparison to other agencies. This has implications for small and marginal farmers as 
commercial banks showed a distinct  preference in lending to large farmers, which further 
accentuated during the doubling period (see Table 7). 
Table 7: Land size wise distribution of credit advanced by Schedule 
Commercial Banks - All India
Year Share in Amount disbursed Share in No. of accounts
MF SF LF MF SF LF
1985-86 27.52 26.24 46.24 46.75 29.55 23.7
1990-91 30.16 24.32 45.52 48.07 29.89 22.04
2001-02 26.7 26.81 46.49 38.43 27.73 33.84
2003-04 24.94 23.02 52.04 42.83 31.1 26.07
2005-06 25.06 26.25 48.69 40.54 29.73 29.73
2006-07 21.24 19.72 59.04 37.88 25.46 36.66
MF =Marginal Farmers, SF= Small Farmers, LF =Large Farmers ( Above 2 hectares)
Source: Handbook of Statistics on the Indian Economy, RBI.
The share of marginal and small farmers both in terms of the number of accounts and the 
amount disbursed in the total have declined over the last two decades. In 2006-07, large 
farmers almost accounted for 60 percent of the total amount disbursed by commercial 
banks. Such a trend in the backdrop of the fact that  commercial banks account for more 
than 70 percent of the total institutional agriculture credit flow (at the all India level) 
implies a credit squeeze for the small and marginal farmers. Thus, it is not surprising that 
the non-institutional share in rural credit market has increased in this decade compared to 12
the previous decade. Moreover, the per account credit disbursed across land holding size 
is increasingly getting skewed and widening in favour of large farmers. 














































































































































































upto 1 ha 1 to 2 ha above 2 ha
Figure 3 shows that  since 2001-02 the gap between the large farmers and the other two 
categories in terms of per account disbursement started widening at a rapid pace. Further, 
the  doubling  period  saw  almost  a  vertical  rise  in  the  curve  relating  to  large  farmers 
indicating the widening gap- in the year 2005-06, the large farmer per account credit 
disbursement stood at Rs. 89051 and the same for small and marginal farmers was Rs. 
48000, and Rs.33619 respectively (Figure 3). There is hardly any evidence in terms of 
any real sector needs  justifying  this sudden increase in the per account disbursement. 
Perhaps, the only plausible explanation lies in the commercial banks urge to achieve the 
credit targets by sanctioning and extending more credit per account in the large farmer 
account heads. 
6. MICROFINANCE AND AGRICULTURE
The  post- liberalization  period  saw  a  paradigm  shift  in  the  banking  sector  which  
coincided with the growth of a silent microfinance revolution in rural India. The genesis 
of this was a NABARD initiated pilot, the SHG-Bank linkage project in 1991, which 
focused on Self Help Groups(SHGs) as a channel for delivery of micro finance. This 
grew manifold to emerge as the largest microfinance programme in the world in which 
cumulative credit  of Rs 180.4 billion ($4.5 billion) had been disbursed to 2924973 SHGs 
which  were  credit  linked  to  nearly  45000  branches  of  50  public  and  private  sector 
commercial banks, 96 Regional Rural Banks and 352 cooperative banks by March 2007. 
With an average group membership of 13-15, at least 41 million families had access to 
formal savings and credit facilities through SHGs. More than 4500 NGOs are involved in 
forming,  nurturing  and  guiding  SHGs alongwith  a  large  number  government 
development agencies and grassroots level volunteers (NABARD, 2007). 13
6.1 Microfinance and Credit needs of Agriculture Sector
The microfinance revolution has confined itself essentially to rural micro enterprises as it 
catered to the requirements of the non-farm sector and satisfied immediate consumption 
needs. Non-farm business activities generate regular income and permit repayment in 
frequent and small installments. Farm sector activities, on the other hand, have relatively 
longer and less stable production cycles, the nature of income accruals from agriculture is 
significantly  influenced  by  risks  associated  with  natural  factors  such  as  rainfall  and 
droughts,  so few  microfinance  institutions  lend  exclusively  for  agricultural  activities. 
Additionally, the features of the SHG model like loans in proportion to savings, weekly/
monthly repayments, shorter loan terms, higher than market interest rates and insistence 
on  regular  group  meetings  make  it  unattractive  to  farmers’  needs.  So,  microfinance 
though suitable for microenterprise financing cannot serve the credit needs of agriculture 
in its existing forms. 
6.1.1 Interest rates and loan tenures in agricultural finance
Interest  rates  in  microfinance  are  generally higher  than  interest  rates  for  other  credit 
products  in  the  banking  sector due  the  cost  of  both  operations  and  resources  for 
microfinance institutions and service providers. However, the higher interest rates are not 
an issue in consumption finance as they usually substitute for credit at usurious interest 
rates  from  moneylenders.  Neither  does  this  matter  for  microenterprises,  as  credit 
requirements are  low and the velocity of operations is high within a short time frame and 
the sheer volumes. But agriculture (excluding allied activities like dairy, poultry, sheep 
and goat rearing) is a seasonal operation with inflow of funds only when the produce is 
harvested and marketed and hence cannot service high rates of interest.
Further, long-term capital investments in agriculture have long gestation periods and in 
many instances, do not have any direct income generation. The investment may only be 
reflected in improved returns from existing farms. For refinancing long-term investment 
finance, NABARD has adopted a project approach wherein the interest rates on credit 
have to be factored in at a level which ensures the viability of the project. Higher interest 
rates would render the project unviable and exclude it from financing. Though higher 
interest rates in microfinance are sometimes justified by the need to meet institutional 
loan  administration  costs,  the  borrower  should  not  be  expected  to  subsidise  the 
inefficiency of the credit dispensing institution by paying higher interest rates.   
As far as gestation and repayment periods are concerned: production credit in agriculture 
requires a minimum gestation of 6 months, that for investment credit ranges between 3 to 
9  years  and  beyond,  higher  than  most  microfinance  loans.  It  is  doubtful  if  existing 
microfinance methodologies can sustain such long repayment periods. Hence interest rate 
and gestation period make microfinance an unsuitable technology for dispensing credit to 
mainstream agriculture.14
6.2 Credit flow to agriculture under microfinance programmes
A valid criticism in India and elsewhere has been that microenterprise and consumption 
financing have been the focus of microfinance efforts with financing agriculture taking a 
back seat. In 2006-07, total credit flow under all models of microfinance was estimated to 
be Rs  75 billion  ($ 1.87  billion),  of which only  8  percent  went  to  direct  agriculture 
including crop loans and 14 percent to animal husbandry. The balance 78 percent went 
towards consumption, microenterprises and trade credit with almost no credit flow for 
mainstream agricultural investment activities like Farm Mechanisation, Minor Irrigation 
or Land Development. Thus microfinance per se, has been unable to cater to agricultural 
finance needs in India.
6.3 Innovations in Microfinance for Agriculture
This has thrown up a variety of innovations expanding the basic microfinance principles 
to include not just credit and other financial services but also knowledge and skills about 
improved technologies to  use these services.  Increasingly, it  is  being realized  that  in 
agriculture, complementarity in inputs (as opposed to substitutability) is  essential for its 
success. Three such innovative practices-Joint Liability Groups,  Village Development 
Councils-Farmers’ Clubs and SHG-Contract farming linkage model are discussed here:
6.3.1 Joint Liability Groups
Tenant farmers and oral lessees without land in their name to serve as collateral find  it 
extremely difficult to access mainstream agricultural financial institutions. To cater to 
this  category  of  farmers,  NABARD  formulated  a  pilot  project  for  financing  Joint 
Liability  Groups  (JLGs)  in  2005-06 broadly  based  on  the  experience  of  BAAC  in 
Thailand,  which sought  to  streamline  credit  flow  to  mid-segment  clients.  The  model 
aimed at identifying collateral substitutes like peer pressure/ social collateral even for 
lendings of a higher order. JLGs were:
 Informal groups comprising 4-10 individuals coming together to avail  bank loan 
either singly or through the group against mutual guarantee.
 Could be formed by small/marginal farmers, sharecroppers residing in the same 
village /area who know and trust each other.
 Is primarily intended to be a credit group, but group savings may be an optional 
activity.
 The quantum of credit need not be linked to savings and no collateral need be 
insisted upon by banks against their loans to JLGs
 Banks may  initially  form  JLGs  using  their  own  staff  or  engage  business 
facilitators like NGOs and other individual rural volunteers to assist them.15
6.3.2 Extending Credit under JLGs - Progress 
The  experiment  showed  that  two  different  approaches  were  adopted  by  States one 
through SHGs and the other individually  in extending credit to the targeted sections. 
Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu: Tenant farmers were extended credit through the SHG 
route.  In  Maharashtra,  3621  SHGs  of  tenant  farmers  were  formed  and  financed  by 
cooperatives,  474  SHGs  were  financed  by  RRBs  due  to  the  efforts  of  NGOs  who 
identified the tenant farmers. Agriculture credit was not extended to share croppers and 
oral lessees due to lack of records on land use. In Tamil Nadu, 59433 SHGs of tenant 
farmers were extended credit to the tune of Rs.1.36 bln.
Rajasthan: In 2004-05,  1774 tenant farmers, 288 oral lessees, 939 sharecroppers were 
advanced Rs.0.04 bln, Rs 0.01 bln and Rs 0.01 bln respectively.
Madhya Pradesh: A total of 191 tenant farmers were advanced credit by commercial 
banks. No agricultural credit was extended to oral lessees and sharecroppers by formal 
banking institutions due to lack of land records.
Uttar Pradesh: The number of sharecroppers supported was 20,000 and 7900 oral lessees  
were advanced Rs 0.76 bln and Rs 0.17 bln respectively. 
6.3.4 JLGs in Andhra Pradesh
In Andhra Pradesh, JLGs function under the banner of Rythu Mithra (Farmers’ Friend) 
Groups (RMGs) consisting of 15 like minded small/marginal and tenant farmers, acting
as an interface between the agriculture extension system and farmers. Since 2003, the 
Agriculture Department has been promoting RMGs to serve as a conduit for technology 
transfer, facilitate access to market information and carry out activities like soil testing, 
training, assess input requirements etc. 203,000 RMGs were formed in 2003 to extend 
credit to farmers unable to access credit for various reasons. 
The salient features are: monthly/fortnightly meetings at specific times, savings of Rs.50 
per member, bank accounts in the name of RMGs, democratic internal lending of savings 
and  book  keeping  for  group  accounts.    After  six  months  of  active  existence,  RMG 
submits a micro credit plan to the bank and is credit linked in the ratio of savings to loan, 
1:20.  The credit may be for investment, production or consumption purposes. The rate of 
interest  on  internal  lending  varied  between  12  and  36  percent.  The  pilot  was 
mainstreamed and extended to all districts in 2005-06 based on the positive feedback 
received.  RMG’s enabled the inclusion of tenant farmers, sharecroppers and oral lessees 
who were left out of the formal banking system earlier and  14.3 percent of the total 
farmers assisted were tenant farmers.
A study undertaken to evaluate the efficacy of RMGs in credit delivery showed that  
though their functioning was satisfactory, areas of concern were capacity building of the 
groups, as many members were unclear about the concept, though they were aware of the 
advantages. Small holders and tenant farmers deprived of formal credit earlier due to lack 
of records and forced to borrow from moneylenders at exorbitant rates could get bank 
credit at cheaper rates. Bankers welcomed the programme as they could finance greater 16
numbers of smallholders in a group mode thereby expanding outreach without adding 
accounts and reducing transaction cost.
Two  banks  were  studied  in  greater  detail,  the  Deccan  Grameena  Bank  (DGB)  and 
Sapthagiri Grameena Bank (SGB). DGB had implemented the RMG scheme through its 
17 branches in Nizamabad district of Andhra Pradesh and had opened savings account for 
1500  RMGs,  but  only  165  RMGs  i.e.  11  percent  credit  linked  to  the  tune  of  Rs.18 
million.  The outstanding loans under the RMGs as on 31 March 2008 were Rs.7.97 
million (118 accounts) 
Out of the total 4965 RMGs with Sapthagiri Grameena Bank (31 March 2008), only 6.22 
percent were credit linked with Rs 52.05 million in total loans.  The repayment was 92 
percent  with  no  non-performing  assets.  The  reasons  cited  by  bankers  for  the  low 
percentage of credit  linking RMGs  were lack  of homogeneity among  members, little 
awareness about the concept among branches and RMGs, unwillingness of the members 
to offer mutual guarantee if individual loans could be availed instead. 
6.4 Joint Liability Groups (JLGs) in Kerala
This section discusses the recent experiences of banks in Kerala which financed through
JLGs – some with first time clients and others with existing clients organised as JLGs. 
The  Irinjalakuda  Cooperative  Agriculture  Development  Bank  in  Trichur  district 
expanded its client base to include tenant/landless farmers, oral lessees in order to reach  
a new client segment and hike business volume.  While the earlier system had lent only to 
farmers  with  own  land  holding  with  mortgaged  land  as  security,  the  JLG  approach
allowed banks to offer group loans through a cash credit facility usually set for 3 years, 
requiring only one set of documentation from the client, saving expenses and efforts for 
both (Jeyaseelan, Mahadevan and Zak, 2008). 
State Bank of Travancore in Alapuzha district designed a range of products  to cater to 
the  special  needs  of  their  activity  based  JLGs  like  sheep  rearing,  paddy  cultivation, 
vegetable cultivation, coir product making, fisheries and tailoring enabling  the bank to 
offer different repayment options to match with the cash flow of the activity chosen.  
JLG  financing  offered  tenant  farmers  and  sharecroppers  loans from  formal  financial 
institutions and the opportunity to jointly take up an economic activity with substantial 
capital outlay.  JLGs also serve as a potential tool for livelihood support and provide the 
required  backward  and  forward  linkages  including  skill  upgradation  through  their 
Federation  JLGs  or  through  promoting  institutions  like  NGOs  or  farmers club.  After 
availing loans through JLGs, many farmers stopped distress sale of their produce, were 
able to negotiate a higher price with traders as a group. In some villages JLGs have 
inculcated a strong repayment culture amongst bank borrowers. 
Wherever  JLGs  had  the  support  of  promoting  institutions  like  NGOs,  farmers  club, 
village councils, their performance was better than those without such support. When 17
carved out of their SHGs, they were cohesive, stable and bankers seem to prefer lending 
to women JLGs. 
As the JLG mechanism is an individual loan with a group approach (joint liability) it 
offers a collateral substitute.  It should also be promoted as an individual loan. The loan 
size/ limit should be treated flexibly to avoid under financing and over financing.  For 
collateral based traditional loans under JLGs, the collateral free limit should be raised 
from the present level of Rs.2, 00,000.  Risk based pricing models should be adopted for 
JLG financing as first time and repeat loan borrowers pose different types of risk. The 
product features have to be fine-tuned based on current experiences. NABARD needs to 
upscale and mainstream this very effective instrument for agriculture microfinance. 
6.5 Village Development Council-Farmers’ Club Model
Aligarh Gramin Bank  -the Regional Rural Bank in Aligarh district of Uttar Pradesh in 
Northern India-  launched a basic SHG model in 1994-95. It was soon realised that in this 
irrigated,  agricultural  belt,  farmers  required  more  than  just  financial  services.  They 
required advice, guidance regarding farming practices, technology, prices etc. 
The Gramin Bank then decided to rework the NABARD conceived Farmers’ Club to set 
up Village Development Committees (VDC) with 1 member for every 25 households in 
the village, giving representation to different communities. Care was taken to ensure that 
they  were  non-defaulters and  service  minded  individuals.  Besides  functioning  as  a 
farmers’ club for the village, the VDC emerged as a platform to bring extension services 
to the village and a clearinghouse for data on prices and markets. All the VDCs in the 
service area of a branch were federated into a Branch Farmers’ Club (FC) as shown 
below.
Figure 4: VDC-Farmers’ Club
This was an improvement on the earlier Farmers’ Clubs , most of which depended on the 
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on transfer. There was no institutional back up to sustain the set up. However in this 
model, the Branch FC was based on a number of VDCs that ensured the sustainability 
and effective functioning of the Club. 
The VDCs served as a link between the villagers and the branch and helped the latter
assess credit needs, identify borrowers, assist in recovery drives and monitor end use of 
credit.  They  were  also  able  to  coordinate with government  initiated  projects to  form 
SHGs. Two VDCs tied up with Tata-Rallis to bring contract farming in Basmati Rice to 
their  villages. Almost  all  VDCs  successfully  replicated programmes  on  fertiliser  and 
water usage. 
The VDCs positively impacted the RRB’s business, and due to their transparency and 
wider participation levels improved the issue of KCCs, growth of deposits/advances and 
improved recovery levels. However, the major success was the extension of credit to 
sharecroppers and tenant farmers.
This model evolved based on the needs emerging from below and was not superimposed 
and was successful in introducing diversified agriculture to the district. NABARD has 
suggested replicating this to the 26,000 Farmers Clubs many of which now follow the 
Aligarh model. 
6.6 SHG-Contract Farming Linkage Model
The  Kerala  Horticulture  Development  programme  (KHDP)  in  the  state of  Kerala 
provides interesting insights in including smallholders while initiating the financing of 
contract farming arrangements. In this unique and innovative approach based on the SHG 
approach, production activity is organized through farmers mobilized in groups. These 
SHGs  manage their own  affairs and some members  take the role of Master Farmers 
serving as the link for technology, market and information. 
Master farmers trained under the programme through an institutionalised arrangement 
serve as role models and facilitate group marketing approach at designated field centres
(which serve as bulking points for trader/marketer linkages). The outreach of farmers 
under the programme is high: 41,000 farmers formed into 1886 SHGs. 
The value addition in this framework is that small farmers formed into activity SHGs 
connect themselves neutrally with an agribusiness unit or a contracting firm. Trained 
Master  farmers  could  serve  as  field-level  office-less  extension  agents  and  the 
intermediary  could  serve  as  an  output  aggregator/collector.  This  could  serve  as  an 
informal  institutional  arrangement  for  production and marketing,  enabling  a  better 
producer  orientation  to  backward  linkages.  Master  farmers  besides  helping  the 
aggregation process can support the aggregator social intermediary smoothen the link 
with  corporate  entities  - negotiating  terms,  quality, quantity, periods  and  other  input 
services that the entity can provide. However, it would be ideal for the aggregator and 
master farmers to ensure that only 50-70 percent of the produce is tied up through these 
contracts leaving some option of sale through external markets. For any relationship to 
stand the test of time and remain sustainable, it would be ideal to issue equity shares of 19
the agro-processing firm to the stakeholder farmers. This would strengthen the linkages 
and ensure continuity of the relationship. 
In  this  approach  of  contract  farming,  high  value  crop  production    takes  place  in  a 
decentralised  way  while  marketing  is  centralised.  This  system  generates  a  potent 
incentive in the form of higher returns, field level value addition and larger economic 
margins for the producers. The intermediary (Figure 5) also signs a single contract on 
behalf  of  all  the  smallholders.  The  individual  SHG  maintains  a  logbook,  so  proper 
monitoring, risk minimization and a proper incentive mechanism in the long run can be 
built in. Any risk not shared by the contracting firm could be shared by the farmers via 
pooling. The contracting firm also reduces its transaction costs in this arrangement. 
Figure 5
By encouraging farmers to diversify crops and linking them to markets, the programme 
increases opportunities for smallholders to benefit from market participation. Contracting 
as of now is a very unbalanced relationship with farmers lacking the market power to 
leverage and negotiate better deals. So fair contract systems can be achieved if farmer 
power is aggregated to mutually benefit and enable longer, equitable relationships. This 
arrangement  could  emerge  as  a  means  to  better  public  service  delivery,  including 
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7. CONCLUSIONS AND THE WAY FORWARD
This discussion shows that the contribution of small farms to agricultural growth and 
India’s food security is unmatched by any other class of farms. Despite this, small farms 
have not received the support of institutional mechanisms especially credit supply since 
the financial sector reforms began in the 1990s. Microfinance seen as the solution for all 
credit deprived sections of the economy also has been unable to meet the requirements of 
agriculture because of its inherent weaknesses.
Public policy in countries like India should emphasise on strengthening and expanding 
the institutional credit delivery mechanisms for agriculture. This involves revitalising and 
expanding  the  cooperative  credit  structure  and  the  rural  banking  network  and  the 
adoption of policies to ensure the flow of credit to agriculture.
However importance  should  be  given to  encourage  and mainstream  innovations.  The 
models  of Joint  Liability Groups,  Village Development  Councils,  Farmers Clubs  and 
Self-Help  Group-Contract  Farming  Linkage  Model  indicate  that  through  suitable 
innovations, effective institutional structures can be built to take care of credit and other 
financial  services  for  agriculture,  especially  small  farms.  The  basic  feature  of  these 
models is that they are all operating on a pilot basis in certain parts of the country. But 
the results from all the pilots are satisfactory and the next stage is for an apex institution 
like  NABARD  to  plan  for  upscaling  and  operationalising  the  models  throughout  the 
country  and  mainstream  them  as  had  been  done  in  case  of  the  SHG-Bank  linkage 
programme. In this we perceive a way forward to meet the credit needs of small farms in 
future in India.
Note: The notation used for Rupee, the Indian currency (INR) is Rs. The exchange rate 
varied between Rs 42 to Rs 48 per 1 US Dollar between 2005 and 2008.21
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Annexure I
Institutional Arrangements for Rural Finance
Reserve Bank of India Government of India
Depositors & Borrowers MFIs - 800 Self Help Groups
Commercial Banks - 84
Semi Urban  Branches - 15370
Rural Branches - 30776
Regional Rural Banks - 96
Branches - 14500
SCBs - 31
DCCBs - 367+13230 Br
PACs - 108779
ARDBs - 20
PARDBs - 727+1958 Br
Rural Cooperatives
NABARD